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THE TAX ARTICLES OF THE MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
By H. H. WALKER LEwIs*
Although the Maryland Declaration of Rights has had a
declining significance in the decision of tax cases, it is still
basic to our governmental structure and has much current
as well as historical interest.
The Declaration of Rights is a statement of principles.
Unfortunately, many of them show the wear of time. The
tax articles, especially, have undergone erosion through the
impact of changed conditions and the human tendency to
be guided by expediency when dealing with the harsh
realities of revenue requirements.
BACKGROUND OF DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Our War of Independence was not merely a struggle
against British domination; it was a social revolution as
well. It came during a period of ferment, when thinking
people were reexamining the principles of government and
when political and economic theories were undergoing
drastic change. It was more than coincidence that Adam
Smith's "Wealth of Nations" should have been published
in the same year as the Declaration of Independence, and
that this same period should have ushered in the first prac-
tical adaptation of the steam engine to industrial use.
The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 was only
one of many bills of rights in this country.' All had the
* Of the Bar of Maryland; A.B., 1925, Princeton University; LL.B., 1928,
Harvard Law School.
ISee WmLI.Am C. WEBSTER, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, Publication No. 200 of the Amer. Acad.
of Pol. and Social Science (Phila., 1897) ; and LEILA R. CUSTARD, BILLs OF
RIGHTS Ix AmERIcAN HISTORY, No. 24 of the Social Science Series published
by the Univ. of Southern California Press (Los Angeles, 1942). The latter
paper lists 46 different bills of rights and points out that "no taxation
without representation" formed the central theme of 26 of them.
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same fundamental purpose; all were links in the documen-
tary chain of human liberties running back through the
British Bill of Rights and the Petition of Right to Magna
Charta.
Prior to 1776, the most important of the American bills
of rights was that adopted by the Stamp Act Congress of
1765, which enunciated the cardinal doctrine of the Revolu-
tion, that the colonists were entitled to the common law
rights of Englishmen. Article III of this Declaration was
the forerunner of Art. 14 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. It stated:
"That it is inseparably essential to the Freedom of a
People, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that
no taxes be imposed on them, but with their own Con-
sent, given personally, or by their Representatives."
The Maryland Declaration of Rights and Constitution of
1776 were drafted and adopted by a Convention composed
of delegates elected throughout the State on August 1, 1776.
Neither document was submitted to the vote of the people,
but drafts were printed and distributed so that the dele-
gates could better ascertain the sentiments of their con-
stituents. The actual preparation of the Declaration of
Rights was in the hands of a committee consisting initially
of Samuel Chase, Charles Carroll, Barrister, Charles Carroll
of Carrollton, Robert Goldsborough, William Paca, George
Plater and Matthew Tilghman;' the draftsmanship has been
attributed primarily to Charles Carroll, Barrister.' Both the
Declaration of Rights and the Constitution proper were
adopted by the Convention on November 3, 1776.
Although British taxes formed the chief stimulant to
colonial unrest, they were not the only exactions that were
regarded by the Convention as oppressive. Lawyers will
be interested to note that while the Declaration of Rights
' Charles Carroll, Barrister and Samuel Chase resigned after the Declara-
tion of Rights had been drafted and were replaced by Thomas Johnson and
Robert T. Hooe. The resolutions and proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1776 are set out in Hanson and Chase, Laws of Maryland,
1765-1784.
3 See KATE MAsoN ROWLAND'S LIFE OF CHRLmS CAT-L ou OF CAmOLLTON
(1898), at p. 190.
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was under consideration by the Convention, Mr. Williams,
of Frederick County, moved the adoption of an article re-
ferring to the oppressiveness of legal fees and prohibiting
charges by practitioners of the law except as fixed by act
of the legislature. The Convention, composed largely of
lawyers, voted down the proposal 46 to 6.
TAx ATICL
The Maryland Declaration of Rights contains two
articles dealing expressly with taxation,4 now numbered
as follows:
Art. 14, prohibiting the imposition of taxes without
the consent of the Legislature;
Art. 15, providing for the uniformity of taxes and
for other matters.
Each dealt with a different problem and each will be sepa-
rately considered.
ARTICLE 14
This Article provides:
"That no aid, charge, tax, burthen or fees ought to
be rated, or levied, under any pretence, without the
consent of the Legislature."
This is a restatement of the principle of the British Bill of
Rights of 1689 and of the Declaration of the Stamp Act
Congress of 1765 that free people ought not be taxed without
their own consent or that of their elected representatives.
This right had not been won easily. Originally, it had
been within the power of the sovereign to lay and collect
taxes without the consent of Parliament or of the people
and the transition from royal prerogative to legislative
control had required centuries of struggle. Nowadays we
take such rights for granted, but our forefathers in 1776
' Other articles of importance in connection with taxes are Art. 8, provid-
ing for the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers of
government; Art. 23, protecting against deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; and Art. 36, providing in part that
no person ought to be compelled to maintain, or contribute to maintain any
place of worship or any ministry. However, the primary significance of
these provisions relates to matters other than taxes and they accordingly
are omitted from consideration in this article.
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were acutely conscious of the blood and courage that had
been required to establish the rights of Englishmen in
this respect.
The first British tax appears to have been imposed in
991 by King Ethelred the Unready to furnish funds to
bribe away the Danish Vikings. It had the usual effect of
appeasement and the Danes came back for more with such
regularity that the Danish tribute became a regular annual
imposition, known as the Danegeld. Magna Charta, in
1215, was precipitated by the excessive money demands of
King John and provided, among other things, for freedom
from "all evil tolls".' The issue of whether taxes could be
levied without the consent of Parliament was brought to a
head by the Petition of Right addressed to Charles I in 1628
and his refusal to recognize this principle led ultimately to
his decapitation, thus giving edge to the point that there
are some things worse than taxes. It was not until 1689,
however, that the illegality of levying taxes without grant
of Parliament was formally written into the law, in the
Bill of Rights of that year.
The American Revolution was largely attributable to
the refusal of the British Crown and Parliament to recog-
nize the colonists' demand for equivalent rights, summed
up in the principle of "no taxation without representation".
The success of the Revolution established this principle in
America but, like most such rules, it is more difficult to
apply than to state. The major difficulties of application are
to determine first, the nature of the power to tax, and
second, the extent to which it may be delegated.
In general, taxation may be divided into two parts;
(1) the elements that enter into the imposition of the tax,
including the determination of the amount of money to be
raised, the persons to pay it, and the general rules or
standards under which it is to be imposed; and (2) the
steps to be taken for its assessment and collection. The first
5 The term "evil tolls" referred to royal exactions other than the cus-
tomary duties on wool, hides and leather. Magna Charta expressly recog-
nized the right of the crown to continue to collect the "ancient and right
customs", in which connection note the present use of the words "customs"
and "duties" to denote taxes on exports and imports.
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is a legislative function; the second is administrative. Under
our theory of separation of powers and Art. 14 of the Decla-
ration of Rights, the first and most fundamental of these
functions can be exercised only by the legislative branch
of the government. The executive branch can administer
taxes imposed by the legislature but cannot itself create
them.
Under modern conditions there is a tendency to con-
sider the determination of revenue requirements as sepa-
rate from the taxing power. It is clear historically, how-
ever, that the determination of the amount to be raised was
the essence of the taxing power which was vested in the
legislature by the British Bill of Rights and by its Maryland
counterpart. The cause for which our ancestors fought was
the right to say how much.6
As a corollary of the separation of powers, there is a
well recognized general rule that the legislative power to
tax cannot be delegated to nor-legislative bodies.7 The
purpose of this rule, as applied to taxes, is to prevent the
exercise of the taxing power by anyone other than the
people or their elected representatives. For this reason, a
delegation to a county or municipal corporation8 or to the
inhabitants of a given locality9 satisfies the basic principle
and is recognized as proper. In Maryland, however, the
courts have gone beyond this and have permitted what is in
essence a delegation of taxing power to an administrative
body.
By Chapter 7 of the Acts of 1860 control of the police
force of Baltimore City was taken away from the City and
vested in a State-appointed Board of Police Commissioners.
This Board was given the right to determine its own ex-
penses and to requisition the City for such funds as were
I This element of the taxing power has at times been substantially cir-
cumvented by borrowing or by pledging the credit of the State, but abuses
on this score during the internal improvement boom of the early 19th cen-
tury led to the insertion in the Maryland Constitution of 1851 of the require-
ment (now See. 34 of Art. 3) that no debt shall be contracted by the General
Assembly unless authorized by a law providing for the collection of an
annual tax or taxes sufficient to pay the interest and principal within
15 years.
I See CooLLry, LAW OF TAXATxoN (4th Ed., 1924), Sec. 74.
$Alexander v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 5 Gill 383 (1847).
*Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill 11 (1844).
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required to meet them. In the event of the failure of the
City to make funds available, the Board was given the right
to sell certificates of indebtedness which could be used by
the holders for the payment of City taxes. In Baltimore v.
State,10 this Act was upheld, including the provision per-
mitting the Police Board to determine its own expenses
and to require the City to pay them."
Although it may be possible to rationalize this decision
on grounds which do not transgress the literal language of
Article 14, it seems clear that it violates the spirit of that
provision and is an illustration of the aphorism that hard
cases make bad law. The consent of the Legislature to
which Article 14 refers was not intended to be a general
consent empowering an administrative board to determine
how much should be raised by taxes; it was intended to
require the specific consent of the elected representatives
of the people by whom the taxes were to be paid.
There has been an increasing trend toward the separa-
tion of the power to spend from the power to tax. It is most
clearly visible in the Federal Government, but Maryland
bears the same taint at all levels of government. As a some-
what extreme example, there are four small municipalities
which live and spend without levying taxes of their own,
being wholly supported by grants in aid from the state and
federal governments. 12 Such situations may not necessarily
result in financial irresponsibility, but they surely en-
courage it.
The separation of the spending power from the taxing
power is not the specific evil that was envisioned by the
framers of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, but it is a
symptom of the malady which Art. 14 was intended to cure.
When threads fray in the social fabric, the pattern tends
to unravel in more than one direction.
10 15 Md. 376 (1860).
n See also McEvoy v. Mayor & C. C. of Baltimore, 126 Md. 111, 94 A. 543
(1915) and Welch v. Coglan, 126 Md. 1, 94 A. 384 (1915).
1' See letter of transmittal dated May 30, 1950, accompanying and printed
as part of the Second Report of the State Fiscal Research Bureau on Local
Government Finances in Maryland.
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ARTICLE 15
Judge Alfred S. Niles in his work on Maryland Constitu-
tional Law,"3 states that "This Article is perhaps the most
important in the whole Declaration of Rights. It has in
substance been in all our constitutions." This characteriza-
tion, however, referred primarily to the uniformity pro-
vision of Article 15, which at the time of publication of
Judge Niles' book was in process of amendment pursuant
to Chapter 390 of the Laws of 1914.
There are four general subdivisions under this Article
as originally adopted and as subsequently amended: (1)
the prohibition of poll taxes, (2) the exemption of paupers,
(3) provisions with regard to the uniformity of taxes, and
(4) the affirmative provision that taxes may be imposed
with a political view.
Article 15 was originally written as a cohesive whole and
said in effect that taxes for the support of the government
should not be exacted on a per capita basis or from paupers
but should be imposed on those owning property, in pro-
portion to its value. In addition, it recognized the propriety
of imposing taxes "with a political view for the good govern-
ment and benefit of the community". Amendments have
separated the clauses and destroyed the unity of the original
language. As a result, it has become the practice to construe
the different clauses as separable provisions and they will
be so considered in this paper.
A. Poll Taxes
"That the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and
oppressive and ought to be prohibited;"
This provision has been in each of our constitutions and
has been changed only once, in 1864, when the word "pro-
hibited" was substituted for the word "abolished". 4
(1915).
u This change was made to meet the objection of Mr. Henry Stockbridge
of Baltimore City that "we cannot abolish a thing that does not exist".
Debates of Const. Convention of 1864, Vol. I, p. 168.
1953]
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By ordinary definition, any tax by the head is a poll
tax."5 But it is not that simple. It has been held, for ex-
ample, that a law requiring all able-bodied males either to
work on the roads or to pay for a substitute is not a poll
tax. 6 And even after the adoption of the Declaration of
Rights taxes were imposed on bachelors as such." To
understand these apparent contradictions, it is necessary to
examine the evil at which the prohibition was aimed.
At one time the only direct taxes in Maryland were poll
taxes. The view was expressed that they operated in
accordance with ability to pay, inasmuch as wealthy per-
sons owned slaves or had servants and would in effect be
required to pay a larger tax than poorer persons. 8 The
validity of this theory was open to question, but the antip-
athy towards poll taxes in Maryland seems to have been
due primarily to their imposition for the support of the
Church of England.
I In his argument in Appeal Tax Court v. Gill, 50 Md. 377 (1879), at p.
393, Attorney General Gwinn stated that:
"Originally 'levying taxes by the poll', meant not only the taxing of
persons by the head, but included also the taxing of horses, cattle and
other domestic animals, which by several ancient Acts of Parliament
were taxed per capita, without regard to their actual value; against
which system of taxation as 'being grievous and oppressive', frequent
remonstrances were made to the House of Commons."
Somewhat similar was the taxation of slaves by the head, which was the
practice in colonial Maryland.
Poll taxes have never been popular; the English poll tax of 1380 was the
immediate cause of the Peasants' Revolt of the following year, known as
Wat the Tyler's Insurrection. See Dowm.L, HIsTony oF TAxATION AND TAxms
IN ENGLAND (2nd Ed., 1888), Vol. 3, p. 3. One of the rallying cries of this
revolt was "Kill all the lawyers" and in London many of them were mur-
dered by the mob.
18 Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 31 A. 322 (1895).
17 See for example Ch. 35, sec. 57 of the Acts of Nov. 1779, imposing a tax
of eleven pounds five shillings upon "all able bodied male inhabitants who
have no families and are above the age of 21 years and under 50." Later
statutes added teeth to the tax on bachelors by empowering the assessor to
have defaulters committed "to the gaol of the county, there to remain till
payment or security given therefor", as see Ch. 4, sec. 60 of the Acts of
Nov. 1781.
A tax on lawyers was contested in Egan v. Charles County Court, 3 H. &
McH. 169 (1793), but was upheld as a license tax. The theory of this case
would not support the tax on bachelors unless being a bachelor is regarded
as a privilege. As to this, deponent sayeth nought, discretion being the
better part of valor.
18 Governor Sharpe in a letter dated November 9, 1757, to Secretary
Calvert characterized the poll tax as "the most equitable way of raising
money in this colony .... As our entire estates consist for the most part in
servants and negroes, those who have the most property pay the greatest
share of the tax."
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In 1692, after the accession of William and Mary, the
Church of England was made the established church of
Maryland and an annual poll tax of 40 pounds of tobacco
was imposed for its support, in addition to special poll taxes
for the construction of churches, etc. This had the effect
of requiring Puritans, Roman Catholics, Quakers and others
to pay for the support of religious beliefs or practices to
which they were opposed. In addition, the ministers of the
Church of England, whose positions were at the time re-
garded as sinecures, were not then held in universal esteem.
In 1714 Governor Hart wrote to the Bishop of London that,
while there were some worthy persons among the clergy
of Maryland, "I am sorry to represent to your Lordship,
on the contrary, that there are some whose education and
morals are a scandal to their profession." Scharf, in his
History of Maryland,"9 refers to them by such unflattering
terms as drunkards and bigamists. He states that in 1734
"There were 36 parishes in the Province and the livings
would average 200 £ per annum, the most valuable Church
holdings upon the Continent and filled with the greatest
proportion of profligate incumbents."
Under the circumstances, it is small wonder that the 40-
pound per poll tobacco tax was regarded as "grievous and
oppressive"." This explanation of the prohibition of poll
taxes in the 1776 Declaration of Rights is supported by the
fact that no comparable restriction was adopted by the
neighboring colonies of Delaware, Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia, where poll taxes do not appear to have been used for
the support of the church.
In all three constitutional conventions since 1776, at-
tempts have been made to eliminate the prohibition against
poll taxes. In the 1851 convention, it was omitted from the
draft proposed by the Committee on the Declaration of
Rights but was restored by amendment from the floor, by
(1879), p. 31.
2Both Andrews and Scharf attribute the constitutional prohibition of
poll taxes to their use for the support of the Church of England, as see:
ANDREWS, STORY OF MARYLAND (1929), p. 268; ScHARF, supra, n. 19, Vol. 2,
p. 33.
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vote of 38 to 31.21 In 1864, the poll tax provision was the
subject of heated debate and was on two occasions voted
out of the Declaration, but was ultimately reinstated by the
vote of 43 to 37.2 It was again debated in 1867 but on this
occasion the amendment eliminating it was voted down
56 to 10.23 A further attempt to permit poll taxes was made
in the amendment of Article 15 proposed by Chapter 242
of the Laws of 1890 and the defeat of this amendment at
the 1891 election has been attributed to its elimination of
the prohibition against poll taxes.24
B. Exemption of Paupers
"that paupers ought not to be assessed for the support
of the government;"
There would seem little profit in taxing paupers, for
which reason this provision in Article 15 may be thought
to be academic. In the light of some of the revelations
which have attended welfare activities, however, it may be
of interest to consider who is a pauper.
Under the Provincial Government persons who received
public alms were exempted from taxation and were deemed
paupers.2' The original draft of the Declaration of Rights
made the term applicable to those "whose assets do not
exceed 30 pounds currency value". This definition was
Debates and Procs. of the Maryland Reform Convention (1851), Vol. I,
p. 187.
2 Debates of the Const. Convention of 1864, Vol. I; pp. 197, 201 and 218.
Much of the discussion of the point was based on the assumption that poll
taxes would or could be imposed as a qualification on the right to vote. Mr.
Frederick Schley, of Frederick County, suggested that a "poll" tax "means
a capitation tax levied upon the voters at the polls" (p. 173), and Mr. John
Barron, of Baltimore City, made a stirring plea for the continuance of the
prohibition against poll taxes on the ground that "there are but two places
on earth where the rich and poor are on an equality, at the ballot box and
at the grave" (p. 168).
' Perlman's Debates of Const. Convention of 1867, p. 132. On this occasion
Judge Albert Ritchie expressed the following modern-sounding sentiment:
"The shadow of the tax collector darkens every door in this land now.
Every species of property is now taxed and burdened to the extremest
limit by Federal and State law. But even the Federal Government, in
its merciless cupidity, has spared the right to vote."
21 FREDEicK J. BRowN, SHORT TALKS ON TAXEs (Baltimore, 1894), p. 14.
2 See Williams' Case, 3 B1. Ch. 186, 255 (1826-8). This is in accordance
with the generally accepted meaning of the term, which is defined in
BouviEa's LA w DicTioNARY as "One so poor that he must be supported at
the public expense."
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apparently too plush for our founding fathers who struck
it out of the article in the course of the Convention, but
the Legislature thereafter enacted that "all persons whose
property shall not be valued above 10 pounds current
money, shall be and are hereby declared paupers, and shall
not be chargeable with any tax to the support of govern-
ment".26 This definition appears to have been superseded
by general exemptions of small holdings of personal prop-
erty and the statutes no longer put a monetary limit on
pauperism.
A strict application of the constitutional exemption of
paupers would raise interesting issues as to the sales tax
and other like taxes which make no provision for such an
exemption. Such a suggestion may appear trivial, but it
should be borne in mind that the most common argument
against sales taxes is their alleged impact on the poor. In
fact, prominent tax reformers have affirmatively attributed
pauperism to indirect taxes. This was one of the premises
of Henry George's "Progress and Poverty", which became
the bible of the Single Taxers, and even Professor Richard
T. Ely (then of Johns Hopkins University, and active in
local tax matters) stated in his "Taxation in American
Cities and States",27 that "there is a connection between in-
direct taxation and pauperism which is worthy of notice".
As a matter of literal construction it should be noted
that the language of Art. 15 is that "paupers ought not to be
assessed". In drafting the original Declaration of Rights
the word "assessed" was used synonomously with the word
"taxed", but the language nevertheless indicates that the
framers of the article had in mind property taxes. This
view gains strength from the fact that the immediately
succeeding clause of the original article applied specifically
to property taxes and that in the 1776 Declaration (also
1851 and 1864) these two portions of the article were sepa-
rated only by a comma, rather than by a semi-colon as in
the 1867 and 1915 versions.
20 Md. Laws, Nov. 1781, Ch. 4, Sec. 61.
(1888).
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C. Classification and Uniformity
As originally adopted in 1776, this Article of the Decla-
ration of Rights contained the following provision immedi-
ately following the exemption of paupers:
"... but every other person in the State ought to
contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support
of government according to his actual worth in real or
personal property within this State;"
This provision has been attributed to Adam Smith's
"Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations", 8 which states the following as the first maxim
with regard to taxes:
"I. The subjects of every State ought to contribute
towards the support of the government, as nearly as
possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that
is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively
enjoy under the protection of the state."
The Maryland Bill of Rights was drafted during August,
1776, and at least some of its framers were undoubtedly
influenced by Adam Smith's monumental work, this portion
of which had been published earlier in the same year. It
will be noted that Adam Smith's maxim adopts the prin-
ciple of contribution in proportion to revenue, whereas the
test of the Maryland Declaration of Rights was the tax-
payer's worth in property. To the extent that worth is
dependent upon revenue, the two should produce the same
result, but this would be true only in the case of income-
producing property. It would seem, therefore, that the two
statements are variations of the same fundamental principle
of equality but differ in their application of that principle.
29
(1876) Pt. Two, Taxes, Vol. 4, p. 164. For references attributing this
provision to Adam Smith, see Williams' Case, supra, n. 25, 253-4; Appeal
Tax Court v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354, 367-8 (1879) ; and argument of counsel
in Appeal Tax Court v. Gill, 50 Md. 377, 391 (1879).
2 Actually, the two conceptions are not as far apart as our own use of
such language might indicate. It was customary in England, to an extent
not prevalent in this country, to express worth of property in terms of its
annual income. Where an American would say a property is worth $10,000,
an Englishman of the 18th Century would have been more apt to speak of
its value in pounds per annum.
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This portion of Art. 15 has been amended twice, once by
the Constitutional Convention of 1851 and a second time in
1915, pursuant to Ch. 390 of the Laws of 1914. An attempt
to amend it in 1891, pursuant to Ch. 242 of the Laws of 1890,
was defeated by the voters.
The Constitutional Convention of 1851 amended the pre-
existing language in two respects, making it read as follows:
"but every other persons in the State, or person holding
property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of
public taxes, for the support of government, according
to his actual worth in real or personal property [within
this State] ;,,so
The first of these changes was to insert the words "or
person holding property therein" in order to require that
non-residents owning property in the State contribute their
proportionate share to the support of the government.31
The second was to omit the words "within this State" at
the end, thus requiring in effect that a person's obligation
to contribute to the support of the government be measured
by all his property, and not merely by his property "within
this State".32
At the time of these amendments, refinements as to the
tax status of intangibles had not been developed and the
Constitutional debates exhibit considerable confusion as to
whether stock owned by a Maryland resident in an out-of-
State corporation was or was not property within the State.
Intangibles were, however, to play hob with the uniformity
requirement of the Declaration of Rights and, as we shall
11 The language in italics being added and that in brackets being deleted.
aThis addition was made in the draft submitted by the Convention's Com-
mittee on the Declaration of Rights, and was not debated on the floor of the
Convention. The chairman of this Committee was Thomas Beale Dorsey,
then Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.
"This change also originated in the draft submitted by the Committee on
the Declaration of Rights but touched off heated discussion in the Conven-
tion itself, an amendment being proposed by Alexander Randall of Anne
Arundel County to revert to the language of the original article in this
respect. The amendment was debated on the issue of whether the State
should tax its citizens' investments outside the State, particularly in cor-
porate stocks. See Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Con-
vention, pp. 226-235.
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see, contributed in 1915 to a much more drastic revision of
this same provision.
In 1776, when the first constitution was adopted, wealth
was almost entirely in the form of tangible property. This
situation was substantially changed by the industrial revo-
lution, which led to the creation of intangible property on
a large scale. Intangibles were not, however, susceptible
of the same tax treatment as tangibles. Assessment was
difficult, avoidance easy, and in those cases where the tax
laws could be applied against such property, rigorous en-
forcement had the effect of penalizing the honest and of
driving capital out of the State.
Accordingly, the growth of intangible property put an
increasing strain on the constitutional rule of uniformity.
The language of the Bill of Rights required that taxes be
apportioned in accordance with actual worth in real and
personal property, including intangible property, and an
avowed purpose of the 1851 amendment had been to extend
this rule to intangibles representing investments outside
the State. But in actual practice, it was not feasible to tax
intangibles uniformly with other property.
This situation ultimately led to the classification amend-
ment adopted by the voters in 1915 pursuant to Chapter 390
of the Laws of 1914, which took the form of striking out the
requirement that property taxes be apportioned according
to actual worth and of substituting in its place the following
provision:
"that the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules,
provide for separate assessment of land and classifica-
tion and sub-classifications of improvements on land
and personal property, as it may deem proper; and all
taxes thereafter provided to be levied by the State for
the support of the general state government, and by the
counties and by the City of Baltimore for their respec-
tive purposes, shall be uniform as to land within the
taxing district, and uniform within the class or sub-
class of improvements on land and personal property
which the respective taxing powers may have directed
to be subjected to the tax levy; ... "
[VOL. XIII
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The background and development of this change were as
follows:
(1) Defects of the property tax. By the 1880's changes
in economic conditions had brought to light serious defects
in the property tax as applied to intangible wealth and had
led to the appointment in 1885 of a commission to study and
revise the system of taxation in Baltimore City. This in
turn led to the appointment of a similar commission in
1886 to recommend changes in the State law.
33
Both commissions split on the issue of whether the
general property tax could be made, workable without an
amendment eliminating or changing the constitutional rule
that taxes be in proportion to worth in real and personal
property. The lawyers on the commissions, whose approach
was essentially practical, took the position that improve-
ment was feasible without constitutional change and recom-
mended the annual assessment of personal property on the
basis of sworn returns. Professor Ely, on the other hand,
viewed the issue academically and wrote a separate report
in each case arguing that attempts to improve the system
were futile without first eliminating the constitutional
straight-jacket of uniformity.
The crux of this issue related to intangibles, as to which
Dr. Ely stated (at pages 42 and 50 of the printed report of
the Tax Commission of Baltimore):
"Many forms of personal property can be concealed
beyond the reach of the tax assessor and tax gatherer,
and they are precisely those forms which are of con-
stantly increasing importance in the modern state....
The Tax Commission of Baltimore was appointed pursuant to ordinance
of May 9, 1885, and rendered its report to the Mayor and City Council under
date of January 9, 1886. The Commission consisted of John P. Poe, Chair-
man, Summerfield Baldwin and Richart T. Ely (then a professor at Johns
Hopkins University; and shortly thereafter the author of TAXATION IN
AMESICAN CITris AND STATES, published in 1888). Charles M. Armstrong
acted as Secretary but was not a member of the Commission itself.
The Maryland Tax Commission was appointed pursuant to Ch. 488 of the
Laws of 1886 and reported to the General Assembly of Maryland under
date of January 20, 1888. The members of this commission were John P.
Poe, Richard T. Ely, James Alfred Pearce (later a Judge of the Court of
Appeals) and Charles M. Armstrong. James MeSherry had originally been
appointed to the commission but was elected chief judge of the sixth judicial
district and did not thereafter participate in the proceedings of the com-
mission. It will be noted that three of the four members of the State com-
mission had served on or with the Baltimore City commission.
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"Our present system of taxation corrupts the morals
of the people. The spectacle of men of large means
escaping taxation by a resort to devices easily at their
command, causes dissatisfaction and bitterness on the
part of the masses and leads others to justify themselves
for this, their attempt to defraud the government."
(2) Proposed 1890 amendment. As an outgrowth of
these views, Dr. Ely 34 prepared certain proposed amend-
ments to Article 15, portions of which were enacted by
Chapter 242 of the Laws of 1890 and submitted to the voters
at the election of that year. The amendments proposed by
this Act not only covered the classification of property for
tax purposes, but also sought to eliminate the Constitutional
prohibition against poll taxes, to authorize the taxation of
incomes, and to give constitutional sanction to the exemp-
tion of property owned by religious, charitable and educa-
tional institutions. The amendment failed of adoption by a
margin of about 6,000 votes, only 70,000 having voted on
the issue out of 192,000 ballots cast in the election. A com-
mentator of the time attributed its defeat to the proposed
elimination of the prohibition against poll taxes."5
(3) Wells v. Hyattsville. Although most tax reformers
of that day were in favor of separately classifying and tax-
ing intangible property, there was also a strong movement
in support of the tax reforms advocated by Mr. Henry
George in "Progress and Poverty", which would have had
the effect of exempting it entirely. Mr. George's program
came to be known as the Single Tax movement, due to the
proposed limitation of taxes to a single source, the unearned
increment believed to be inherent in land values. Although
generally frowned upon by orthodox economists and tax
authorities, this movement had great appeal and developed
an almost religious fervor in its adherents. In Maryland it
was especially strong in the communities fringing the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
81 At p. 394 of his work on TAXATION IN AMERCAN CITIES AND STATES,
Professor Ely states that he prepared these amendments at the request of
certain prominent business men of Baltimore.
,1 See n. 24.
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In 1892 the Single Taxers gained control of the Board
of Commissioners of the Town of Hyattsville 8 and secured
the passage of a local law37 amending the provisions of the
Town charter with respect to assessments. Superficially,
this amendment seemed to require only that land and im-
provements in Hyattsville be separately assessed, but by
the simple process of eliminating any reference to personal
property from the assessment provisions it had the effect
of exempting such property from taxation. In the general
assessment made after the passage of this law, personal
property was omitted altogether and, in addition, the Town
Commissioners struck out the entire valuation on improve-
ments, thus limiting taxes to the bare land. Opponents of
the Single Tax, led by Mr. Charles Wells, thereupon brought
action to compel the Town Commissioners to restore the
valuation of improvements to the assessable basis and to
assess all personal property. In the ensuing litigation38 the
Court of Appeals voided both the 1892 law and the action
of the Town Commissioners, holding that the constitutional
rule of uniformity required the taxation of personal prop-
erty and improvements, as well as land. This decision had
the effect of blocking the program of the Maryland Single
Taxers unless the uniformity provision of Article 15 of the
Declaration of Rights could be eliminated or amended.
(4) Intangibles Tax of 1896. The next move was made
by those interested in the practical, rather than the theo-
retical, side of taxation and took the form of Chapter 143
of the Laws of 1896, providing for the taxation of income-
producing securities at the limited local rate of 300 per $100.
Impetus for this came from the trust companies, which
were exposed to discrimination and severe competitive dis-
advantages through the application of the full local tax rate
to *the securities which they held in a fiduciary capacity.
By the nature of their business, the local trust companies
were unable to employ the devices commonly used by in-
m Jackson H. Ralston (later a trustee of the Fels Fund, established to
promote the Single Tax), Charles H. Long and George S. Britt formed a
majority of the Board. Mr. Ralston was its President.
I Md. Laws 1892, Ch. 285.
mWells v. Hyattsvllle, 77 Md. 125, 26 A. 357 (1893).
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dividuals to avoid the imposition of intangibles taxes. At
the same time they were in direct competition for business
with individuals and with out-of-state trust companies
which were not subject to comparable .disabilities 9
The limited intangibles tax (generally known as the 30
mil tax) became a substantial revenue producer in Balti-
more City, as shown by the fact that the assessment of in-
tangibles increased from $6,000,000 in 1896 to $150,000,000
in 1908.40 Even its friends, however, recognized that the law
was unconstitutional. For example, Judge Oscar Leser, who
was for many years the dominant figure on the Appeals Tax
Court of Baltimore City and later on the State Tax Commis-
sion of Maryland, stated that:
"Under the Constitution existing in 1896, classifica-
tion was not permissible .... Not until 1914 was the
Constitution of Maryland amended to permit the classi-
fication of property, and notwithstanding that, the law
was absolutely enforced and never questioned because
it was to the advantage of the public in the matter of
revenue and to the advantage of the taxpayer in the
rate he paid."41
(5) The 1915 amendment. The doubts (or worse) as to
the constitutionality of the intangibles tax led tax adminis-
trators and others to seek an amendment to Article 15 to
validate the tax, culminating in the following recommenda-
tion by the Tax Revision Commission of 1912:
"The language of the present section [Article 15 of
the Bill of Rights] amounts to a tax against persons, not
property, and should be amended, and should also
be amended to remove any doubt as to the power of
the Legislature to make reasonable classifications of
property. '4 2
30 See statement of Judge Oscar Leser to the National Tax Association
that the Maryland intangible tax of 1896 "was inspired largely by the
trustee corporations, which found it impossible to make truthful returns
under the general property tax and survive." Proceedings of the Nat. Tax
Assn. 1922, p. 305.
10 See Prof. Charles J. Bullock, Taxation of Intangible Property, at p. 133
of the Proceedings of the National Tax Association, 1908.
a Proceedings of National Tax Ass'n., 1922, p. 307.
2P. 35 of the report of the Commission for the Revision of the Taxation
System of the State of Maryland and City of Baltimore, appointed pursuant
to Md. Laws 1912, Ch. 779.
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This recommendation was seized upon by the Single Taxers,
who became the chief driving force for the revision of
Article 15 and appear to have been responsible for the
actual draftsmanship of the amendment.'" They desired it,
however, for quite different reasons from those of the 1912
Commission, and were opposed to the taxation of intangi-
bles at all. The amendment passed the Legislature as Chap-
ter 390 of the Laws of 1914 and was adopted at the election
of 1915 by a vote of 49,918 to 26,722, out of a total of 240,723
participating in the election.
The most significant changes effected by the 1915 amend-
ment may be summarized as follows:"
(a) It shifted the emphasis from persons to property.
Formerly uniformity related to the worth of the taxpayer,
the requirement being that each person be taxed in accord-
ance with his worth in property. Now the requirement of
uniformity applies to the tax on the property itself.
"In the publisher's note to CONFRONTING THE LAND QUESTION (1945) by
JACKSON H. RALSTON, credit for the amendment is given to Mr. Ralston,
who was the recognized leader of the Single Taxers in Maryland and who
had been president of the Board of Commissioners of Hyattsville at the
time of the abortive 1892 attempt to establish the Single Tax there. Supra,
ns. 36-38. Judge Oscar Leser, whose interest in and knowledge of tax mat-
ters of that period is proverbial, also attributes the 1915 amendment to Mr.
Ralston and the Single Taxers.
By this time it had become the policy of the Single Taxers to move behind
the reforms of others, to the extent that they suited their purposes, rather
than to press the Single Tax program as such. For example, they were
active in Maryland and elsewhere in behalf of the initiative and referendum
and in support of local home rule, which they regarded as steps toward the
achievement of their ends. It is noteworthy that the Home Rule and
Referendum amendments to the Constitution were enacted at the same
legislative session (Chapters 416 and 673, respectively, of the Laws of
1914) and adopted by the voters at the same election, as the amendment of
Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights. Jackson H. Ralston was prominent
in all three reforms and is said to have prepared the initial draft of the
Home Rule amendment, as to which see also the publisher's note to
CONFRONTING THE LAND QUESTION. For an interesting history of the Single
Tax in this country, see ARTHUR N. YOUNG, THE SINGLE TAX MOVEMENT IN
THE U. S. (Princeton Univ. Press, 1916) ; this does not, however, cover the
situation In Maryland.
"A revealing change, in addition to those enumerated, was the shift from
the directory to the mandatory method of expression - from the use of the
word "ought" to the word "shall". Prior to the 1915 amendment Article 15
of the Declaration of Rights was expressed entirely in directory terms, as
befitted a statement of principles, and it had been argued that It should be
read in this light and not as a statement of mandatory rules, as see the
dissenting opinion of Stewart, J., in State v. Cumberland & Penn. R.R. Co.,
40 Md. 22, 63 (1874). But the courts have treated Article 15 as laying down
positive rules of law and the language of the 1915 amendment is in line with
this interpretation.
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(b) Under the amendment, the Legislature is required
to provide for the separate assessment of land and improve-
ments; formerly there was nothing in the Constitution to
prevent the assessment of land and improvements as a unit.
(c) Classification is authorized as to improvements and
personal property, although not as to land.
(d) Taxes must be uniform as to land within each tax-
ing district, and as to personal property and improvements
within each classification, but there is no longer any con-
stitutional requirement of overall uniformity of tax burden.
(e) The amendment authorizes the exemption of classes
of improvements and personal property and is broad enough
to permit the exemption of all improvements and personal
property. No exemption is, however, authorized as to land.
It will be noted that these changes removed the constitu-
tional obstacles to the Single Tax program, the primary
design of which was to exempt all personal property and
improvements from taxation.4 5 The changes also met the
objectives of those favoring a classified property tax, in-
cluding validation of the intangibles tax.
Except as it permitted classification, including exemp-
tion of improvements and classes of personal property, the
1915 amendment was not intended and should not be taken
to have altered the fundamental principle of equality ex-
pressed in the original Declaration of Rights. This has been
expressly recognized by the Court of Appeals in Susque-
hanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission,5 where it was
stated that:
"Although the phrase of the Maryland Bill of Rights,
stating the just and salutary principle that 'every per-
son in the State, or person holding property therein,
ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for
the support of the government, according to his actual
worth in real or personal property', was omitted from
"' Although the Single Taxers were successful in their constitutional pro-
gram in Maryland in 1914 and 1915, their strength was on the wane. The
Single Tax was for a time in effect in Capitol Heights, Maryland, but the
Single Taxers were never able to achieve the adoption of their theories by
the State or county governments in Maryland and their program was ulti-
mately blocked by enforcement of the requirement that local property taxes
be based upon county assessments.
" 159 Md. 334, 343, 151 A. 2d 29 (1930).
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the article as amended by chapter 390 of the Acts of
1914, ratified November 2nd, 1915, yet it is implicit in
the... language of the article as amended: ... "
Furthermore, the principle of equality was written into the
statutory law by Chapter 841 of the Laws of 1914, enacted
at the same session of the General Assembly as the proposal
to amend Article 15. This Act created the State Tax Com-
mission and, among other things, made it the duty of the
Commission to see that:
"all taxable property shall be placed upon the assess-
ment books and equalized between persons, firms and
corporations in all the Counties, Districts, Cities, Towns
and Villages of the State, so that all persons, firms and
corporations shall be assessed alike for like kinds of
property."
This expression of legislative policy has been continued in
the law without change of substance.47
Tendency to Restrict Principle of Uniformity
Although the Declaration of Rights originated as a state-
ment of principles, the tax articles have been treated as
positive rules of law and have been given a restrictive in-
terpretation. This has been particularly marked with re-
spect to the principle of uniformity as set out in Article 15.
Two recent examples should suffice to illustrate this.
(1) Applicability of Art. 15 to assessments. In the case
of Rogan v. Calvert County," the Court of Appeals stated:
"This Court has held that the provision in the
amendment to Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights,
made by Chapter 390 of the Laws of 1914, ratified in
November, 1915, declaring that all taxes to be levied
by the State for the support of the State Government,
and by the Counties and by the City of Baltimore for
their respective purposes, shall be uniform as to land
within the taxing district, refers to levies of taxes and
not to assessments. Leser v. Lowenstein, 129 Md. 244,
250, 98 A. 712."
'
7 Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, Sec. 230 (4).
4871 A. 2d 47, 51 (Md., 1950).
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This case involved assessment procedures, rather than
the validity of any particular assessment, as was also true
of Leser v. Lowenstein,49 which it cites. However, the lan-
guage of the court is couched in general terms and seems
to stand for the proposition that the uniformity requirement
of Art. 15 is limited to tax rates and is not applicable to
assessments. This is the construction placed on this lan-
guage in a recent ruling of the Attorney General" uphold-
ing the validity of Laws of 1951, Ch. 321, which requires the
assessment of stock in trade at 75% of its value for county
taxation in Anne Arundel and Frederick Counties and for
municipal taxation in the City of Frederick, notwithstand-
ing the fact that similar items of property not constituting
stock in trade are required to be assessed at their full value.
This ruling was made with obvious reluctance under what
was felt to be the compulsion of the Court's statement in
Rogan v. Calvert County."1
To make sure that the full implication of this ruling
would not be overlooked by the unwary, the Attorney
General pointed out with admirable candor that under the
statute in question:
"precisely the same type of personal property would
be assessed at different percentages of its value depend-
ing on whether or not it was held by its owner as 'stock
in business' or otherwise."2
The deliberate assessment of some property at 75% of
its actual value, while at the same time assessing at full
value other identical property in the same political sub-
division or taxing district, is so diametrically opposed to
the principle of equality as originally enunciated in the
Declaration of Rights that further examination is in order
to determine how such a result could have been brought
about. If we have in fact gotten so completely turned
around, how did we manage to do it?
- 129 Md. 244, 98 A. 712 (1916).
Opinion dated Aug. 21, 1952, to Albert W. Ward, Secretary, State Tax
Commission; The Daily Record, Sept. 15, 1952.
Supra, n. 48.
U Supra, n. 50.
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Under Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights as origi-
nally adopted, taxes were required to be apportioned in
accordance with the actual worth of the taxpayer in real
or personal property. This necessarily meant uniformity
of assessment as well as uniformity of tax rate and was so
construed by the courts. 3 The Attorney General agreed
with this but, in order to give effect to the language of the
Court of Appeals in the Calvert County case, he concluded
that the 1915 amendment must have changed the rule. This
conclusion raises two questions: (1) what was the pur-
pose and effect of the 1915 amendment, and (2) what did
the court really mean in its statements in Leser v. Lowen-
stein and Rogan v. Calvert County?
With respect to the 1915 amendment effected pursuant
to Laws of 1914, Ch. 390, a number of things are clear:
First, there is nothing in the express language of the
amendment to require such a restricted construction. This
portion of Art. 15 had always used the word "taxes" and
the term had always been held to mean taxes in the realistic
sense of dollar result, not in the limited sense of tax rates.
As pointed out by the Attorney General, property taxes are
the result of applying the rate to the assessed value, for
which reason uniformity can be destroyed just as effec-
tually by discrimination in assessment as by variation in
tax rate. Art. 15 as amended continues to use the same
word "taxes".
Second, there is nothing in the background of the 1915
amendment to indicate that the word "taxes" was used in
a different sense than theretofore, or to indicate any inten-
tion to depart from the basic principle of uniformity. The
concept of uniformity was refined, so as to permit classi-
fication, but it was not abandoned. In fact, all known indi-
cations point to the contrary. For example, the 1912 com-
mission that recommended the amendment of Art. 15 was
intimately concerned with uniformity of assessments. Some
164 pages of its report were devoted to the discussion of
assessments and assessment procedures and it was pri-
See especially, State v. Cumberland & Penn. R.R. Co., 40 Md. 22 (1874),
and Schley v. Montgomery County, 106 Md. 407, 67 A. 250 (1907).
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marily for the purpose of achieving uniformity of assess-
ments that it recommended the establishment of a State
Tax Commission. As stated by the Court of Appeals in
Leser v. Lowenstein:54
"The main object of the creation of the Commission
was to secure the equalization of assessments, . . ."
Third, should there have been any doubt on the subject,
it would have been laid to rest by Susquehanna Power Co.
v. State Tax Commission,55 in which the Court of Appeals
expressly recognized that the 1915 amendment of Art. 15
was not intended to impair the general principle of equality
of assessments.
What then is the explanation of the Court's statement in
Rogan v. Calvert County," as quoted above? Did the Court
mean what the Attorney General reluctantly thought? If
not, what did it mean? It is believed that the explanation
is to be found in Leser v. Lowenstein which was cited as
the basis for the statement.
Leser v. Lowenstein, was a suit to enjoin the reassess-
ment of property in Frederick County pursuant to an order
of the State Tax Commission. Both the statute under which
the State Tax Commission issued its order (Md. Laws 1914,
Ch. 841) and the earlier statutes setting up assessment
standards, antedated the adoption by the voters of the
amendment of Art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights. This
amendment provided, among other things:
"that the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules,
provide for separate assessment of land and classifica-
tion and sub-classifications of improvements on land
and personal property, as it may deem proper;"
It was argued that this provision repealed the prior laws
governing the assessment of property and that, since the
State Tax Commission could not itself adopt assessment
standards (this being a legislative function), it was power-
less to direct a reassessment without additional legislation.
This posed the question of whether the portion of Art. 15
" Supra, n. 49, 260.
5Supra, n. 46.
S0upra, n. 48.
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quoted above was "self-executing", as argued. If it was, it
operated to repeal the existing assessment laws; but if it
was not, such laws would continue in effect until repealed
by the legislature.
The Court held that the provision was not "self-execut-
ing" and accordingly that the State Tax Commission could
proceed under the existing statutes. In the course of reach-
ing this conclusion the Court contrasted it with other parts
of the amendment which clearly were "self-executing", in-
cluding the provision that:
"... all taxes thereafter provided to be levied . . .
shall be uniform as to land" etc.
Then, by way of precaution, the Court added that this
language could not possibly be held to repeal the existing
assessment laws, since, as the Court said, "This provision
refers not to assessments but to future levies of taxes".
In context, the statement of the Court in Leser v. Lowen-
stein is clear and is not at all inconsistent with the principle
of uniformity as previously established. The Court did not
say or mean that the requirement of uniformity should
thereafter be limited to tax rates and should not apply to
assessments. It is only when the statement is lifted out of
context that it can be given this meaning.
This last is, of course, what has happened. The state-
ment was quoted out of context and as a result seems to
have a meaning that the Court making it never intended.
This is doubly unfortunate since the practical effect of the
statement, when isolated and read literally, is to consign
the uniformity requirement of Art. 15 to the junk heap.
(2) Curtailment of the remedy as to unequal assess-
ments. Under the Maryland law a taxpayer has legal stand-
51 To avoid possible confusion, it should be pointed out that Art. 15, as
amended, does not demand uniformity (a) as between different taxing dis-
tricts or (b) as between different classes of improvements and personal
property In the same taxing district. This is the explanation of the valua-
tion and assessment recommendation of the Tax Survey Commission of 1949,
to which the Attorney General refers in his opinion of Aug. 21, 1952, supra,
n. 50. This is, however, far different from authorizing differences In valua-
tion or assessment solely on the basis of ownership or use. To permit the
deliberate assessment of the property of one person at 75% its actual value,
while deliberately assessing identical property in the hands of another per-
son in the same taxing district at 100% is to give the coup de grace to
whatever remains of the principle of uniformity.
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ing to protest and appeal the assessments of others on the
ground that they are too low. 8 In State Tax Commission v.
C. & P. Telephone Co.,59 involving an assessment which a
public utility company alleged to be discriminatory, the
Court applied the converse of this rule, stating:
"If other utilities have been underassessed, appel-
lee's remedy lies not in attempting to be relieved of
the assessment itself but in restraining the Commis-
sion from not properly assessing other utilities."
The fact that a taxpayer may have the right to object to
the underassessment of the property of others should not
mean that this is his only remedy. As a practical matter
such a limitation would largely destroy the remedy. A
taxpayer has a direct financial interest in getting his own
assessment reduced, but he has no comparable incentive in
getting the assessments of others increased. The com-
munity as a whole may benefit from the increase, but the
monetary interest of the individual taxpayer is ordinarily
too small and too remote to justify the expenditure of his
time and money. Accordingly, the rule in question will
eliminate the most effective check on discriminatory assess-
ments, namely, the financial incentive of taxpayers who are
adversely affected.
Even if a taxpayer were willing to incur the expense
and the hostility involved in attempting to increase the
assessments of his neighbors or competitors, he might find
it impracticable to do so. Ordinarily, he will have no knowl-
edge of the discrimination until notified of his own assess-
ment and given an opportunity to investigate the assess-
ments of his neighbors or competitors. By the time he can
do this the time for appealing the other assessments may
have expired."0
1 Schley v. Lee, 106 Md.- 390, 67 A. 252 (1907) ; Anne Arundel County v.
Buch, 190 Md. 394, 58 A. 2d 672, 5 A. L. R. 2d 569 (1948).
193 Md. 222, 235, 66 A. 2d 477 (1949).
Although a taxpayer must be given notice of his own assessment, he
ordinarily receives no notice of the assessments of others and' may experi-
ence difficulty in ascertaining -them. In addition, the individual assessments
are usually staggered, so as to spread the work, and become final at different
times. For these and other reasons the difficulties Involved in asserting the
proposed remedy will often be Insuperable. In fact, In the very case in
which the remedy was suggested it could not have been availed of, due to
[VOL. XIII
MARYLAND TAX ARTICLES
The adequacy of such a remedy was before the U. S.
Supreme Court in a case under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota County,61 and was disposed of as follows in the
opinion of the Court:
"The Supreme Court [of Nebraska] . . . holds that
the Bridge Company has no remedy except 'to have
the property assessed below its true value raised, rather
than to have property assessed at its true value re-
duced.'... Such a result as that reached by the Supreme
Court of Nebraska is to deny the injured taxpayer any
remedy at all because it is utterly impossible for him
by any judicial proceeding to secure an increase in the
assessment of the great mass of under-assessed prop-
erty in the taxing district."
The same rule was more recently applied in Hills-
borough v. Cromwell,62 in which the New Jersey courts had
similarly refused to remedy a discrimination. In that case,
the Supreme Court stated:
"The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the individual from state action
which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by
subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the
same class. The right is the right to equal treatment.
He may not complain if equality is achieved by increas-
ing the same taxes of other members of the class to the
level of his own. The constitutional requirement, how-
ever, is not satisfied if a State does not itself remove the
discrimination, but imposes on him against whom the
discrimination has been directed the burden of seeking
an upward revision of the taxes of other members of
the class."
It is difficult to understand why the principle of equality
in Art. 15 should be given a more restrictive interpreta-
tion than the corresponding principle in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
time limits and other factors. Accordingly, it seems clear that the Court's
statement in State Tax Commission v. C. & P. Telephone Co., ibid., was
merely made in passing, rather than after full consideration.
"260 U. S. 441,445-6 (1923).
326 U. S. 620, 623 (1946).
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D. Taxes Laid with a Political View
"... yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly
be imposed, or laid with a political view for the good
government and benefit of the community."
This portion of Article 15 has been included in all our
Constitutions without substantial change of language 3 and
has been cited in a multitude of cases. The first question
that must be answered, however, is why it should be there
at all.
Except as limited by the State and Federal Constitutions
(including the Declaration of Rights) the State has full
and unrestricted power to tax. Its power in this respect is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty and no constitutional
grant is necessary to create it. 4 Accordingly, if viewed as
a grant of power, this portion of Article 15 is redundant and
did not create any authority not already in existence.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that this clause
could not have been intended as a qualification on the other
clauses of Article 15. It could not have been intended that
taxes could be imposed without restriction provided that
they were laid with a political view. Such a construction
would render the rest of the Article a substantial nullity.65
However, this takes a more legalistic view of the pro-
vision than is justified by its background. The framers of
the Declaration of Rights did not approach their task so
technically. They were experts in human nature rather
Is Aside from changes in punctuation, the only change was the insertion by
the 1851 Constitutional Convention of the words "on persons or property"
following the word "laid", and their deletion by the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1864. The record of the 1851 debates and proceedings does not dis-
close the reason for the addition of these words. The entire clause was dis-
cussed on several occasions at the 1864 convention and one gathers the
impression that its members thought that the original clause was harmlessly
superfluous but that the 1851 addition created a possible inconsistency with
the preceding clauses of Article 15 and should accordingly be eliminated.
At the 1867 convention the Committee on the Declaration of Rights pro-
posed to strike out the words "and justly", but the convention was suffi-
ciently old-fashioned to feel that taxes should be "just" as well as proper,
and refused to accept the amendment.
" Kenneweg v. Allegany Oounty, 102 Md. 119, 62 A. 249 (1905) ; Oursler v.
Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. 2d 763 (1940).
61 As stated by Chancellor Bland in Williams Case, 3 B1. Ch. 186, 257
(1828-31), "No exception can be allowed to have the same extent as the
rule itself."
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than in tax law, and they were stating principles rather
than rigid rules. It was natural that they should give ex-
press recognition to the broad power of the State to impose
taxes and it seems reasonable to assume that the "political
view" clause was included to make it clear to the public
that, except as expressly restricted, the new-born State
would have full taxing power.
Although the courts have expressly recognized the in-
herent nature of the State's power to tax, it is interesting to
note that the "political view" clause has been referred to as
the constitutional basis of taxes other than those on prop-
erty;"8 for example: license taxes, inheritance taxes and in-
come taxes. This does no harm, other perhaps than to mis-
lead the unwary into the assumption that in the State
government, as in the Federal government, an express con-
stitutional basis must be found for all tax exactions. Actu-
ally, of course, this is a vital point of difference between the
State and Federal governments.
The "political view" clause has been all things to all men.
Among other things, it has been held to justify property
taxes which were not regarded as being for the support of
the government but were nevertheless for the good of the
community. For example, Waters v. State,8 7 involved a tax
to finance the colonization of free negroes in Africa. The
court did not consider this to be a measure for the support
of the government but it nevertheless held it valid under
the political view clause as being for the good government
and benefit of the community. Under the broadening stand-
ards of governmental responsibility, the importance of such
a distinction may have diminished, but it is an interesting
precedent.
CONCLUSION1
In closing it should again be emphasized that the Decla-
ration of Rights was a statement of principles. Accordingly,
they should be construed broadly, with a view to giving
effect to their objectives. This was done in the earlier cases
See especially, Oursler v. Tawes, supra, n. 64, 486.
1 Gill 302 (1843).
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but the more recent tendency has been in the opposite
direction. Taxes are by their nature technical. They pro-
mote a battle of wits between tax collectors and taxpayers
and inevitably lead to hair-splitting. These factors are in-
herent in the best of tax systems and they have been greatly
accentuated by the growing cost of government and the in-
creasing complexity of our economic life.
When hairs are to be split, the courts have no alternative
but to split them and it is not unnatural that the tax articles
of the Declaration of Rights, which started out as principles,
have come to be construed as technical rules of law. Nor
may it be unnatural that in this whittling process some of
the objectives of the Declaration of Rights have been lost
to view. But no student of the cases can fail to be impressed
by the extent to which the principles expounded in the
tax articles have been eroded away. Throughout history,
children have been prone to stray from the ways of their
fathers and we in Maryland, notwithstanding that we admit
superiority in most things, have been no exception.
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